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ABSTRACT. 
This study tests the hypothesis that balanced-budget rules (BBRs) that restrict public borrowing 
to investments in public infrastructure increase growth by increasing the productivity of debt, 
either because investments in public infrastructure are more productive than other uses for which 
states borrow funds or because BBRs lower borrowing costs.  Results are based on data at 5-year 
intervals for 49 US states over the period 1957-2007.  The tests strongly support the hypothesis 
that BBRs increase growth by increasing the productivity of debt and withstand a variety of 
robustness checks, including alternative lags, exogeneity tests, GMM estimation, a placebo test, 
and the influence of outliers.   
Keywords: balanced budget rule, infrastructure, fiscal policy, regional growth. 
JEL categories:  A10, E60, H00. 
 
 
2 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Soaring levels of debt in Europe and in the United States have spurred interest in 
balanced-budget rules (BBRs).  The primary economic objection to BBRs is that they overly 
restrict fiscal policy by preventing tax smoothing and impeding stable growth.  Not surprisingly 
then, BBRs are rare among central governments.  However, they are common at the sub-national 
level in the United States, where every state but Vermont has some type of BBR and restriction 
on debt.  Paradoxically, BBRs do not necessarily balance state budgets, for reasons noted by 
Bohn and Inman (1995); Inman (1996); and Reuben and Poterba (1999).   
Many BBRs for example, only apply ex ante, so officials tend to overestimate revenues 
and underestimate expenditures, reducing the extent to which the rules limit fiscal flexibility 
during a budget cycle; and even when BBRs apply ex post, officials often resort to temporary 
accounting manipulations to avoid a deficit.  Moreover, most states only apply BBRs to current 
operations and exempt budgets for public infrastructure projects financed by long-term bonds.  In 
addition, BBRs vary in whether they require the governor to submit a balanced budget to the 
legislature and whether require the legislature is required to pass a balanced budget.  BBRs 
typically incorporate similar limitations for other public entities subject to state jurisdiction. 
Evidence that BBRs do not necessarily balance budgets begs the question: Why did states 
put the rules in place?  Wallis and Weingast (2006) (WW) argue that the primary purpose of 
BBRs is to restrict borrowing to growth-enhancing investments in infrastructure, not simply to 
balance budgets.  WW offer historical and economic context to support their argument, but no 
study has linked the stringency of BBRs directly to higher growth through an increase in the 
productive effect of debt on growth, as is done here. This effect could work through either of two 
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complementary channels: by redirecting borrowing from less to more productive expenditures or 
by lowering the cost of servicing debt.   
Several attributes of BBRs, debt, and the hypothesized influence of BBRs on the growth 
effect of debt aid identification.  1) Most states lodged BBRs and debt-limitation rules in their 
constitutions long ago in the nineteenth or early twentieth century and now rarely make changes; 
2) The stringency of state BBRs varies greatly. 3) The hypothesized effect is a nonlinear 
interaction between debt and the presence and stringency of BBRs, which permits the effect of 
the BBR-debt interaction to be separated from the direct effect of debt.  Lastly, 4) the stock of 
state and local debt tends to accumulate slowly over time, so that both debt and BBRs are 
predetermined, if not strictly exogenous.   We exploit these attributes using several alternative 
estimation strategies.  
II. OTHER EFFECTS OF BBRS 
Several other empirical effects of BBRs are already well documented.  Reuben and 
Poterba (1999) find that balanced-budget and debt-restriction rules lead to lower taxes and lower 
debt, and Alt and Lowry (1997) find that more stringent BBRs are associated with lower 
borrowing costs.  Despite concern that BBRs limit fiscal flexibility needed for counter-cyclical 
policies, Levinson (1997), Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), and Krol and Svorny (2007) provide 
mixed evidence to resolve the issue; Carlino and Inman (2013) find significant power for 
countercyclical deficits but do not focus on the role of BBRs, Both they and Eberts and Stone 
(1993) offer evidence that suggests an explanation for the conflicting results on whether or not 
BBRs increase the volatility of state and local economies: countercyclical deficits are less 
effective in the long run because they induce a subsequent reversal, offsetting earlier effects. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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III.1 Endogenous-growth models 
Endogenous-growth models along the lines of Barro (1989), Adam and Bevan (2005), 
Checherita, et al. (2012), Grenier (2013), and Greiner and Fincke (2012)—to mention only a 
few, have proven to be a useful framework for both theoretical and empirical studies of the 
effects of state fiscal structures on growth.  Unlike traditional neoclassical models, endogenous 
growth models permit a permanent change in fiscal structure to have a permanent effect on 
growth rates. While providing valuable insights, these studies yield widely varying results for the 
link between growth and public debt—zero, positive, negative, and inverse U-shaped. 
Fortunately, the validity of the hypothesis tested here rests on whether BBRs make the effect of 
debt on growth significantly less negative or more positive, not on whether the direct effect of 
debt is zero, positive, or negative.  
 To apply closed-economy endogenous growth models to the open-economy environment 
of state and local economies we assume that states are quasi-open economies with goods and 
factors that respond sluggishly over our recursive lag interval (ten years). In a typical 
endogenous-growth model, output growth in the steady state depends only on structural 
parameters and fiscal structures, such as taxes and other elements of the government budget 
constraint.  The stock of private capital is endogenously determined in these models, so it does 
not appear as an independent variable.   
III.2 Neoclassical-growth models 
Mutatis mutandis, the structural parameters and exogenous variables are common to both the 
neoclassical- and endogenous-growth models. We rely on the latter as the framework for our 
empirical specification, not because of differences in the set of variables relevant to the two 
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models, but because the endogenous-growth models permit permanent changes in fiscal structure 
to have persistent effects, providing a rationale for our recursive structure with long-lags.  
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Our baseline empirical specification is adapted from Bleaney and others (2001), Bania and others 
(2007), and Gray and Stone (2012). It is presented below as equation (1).  We specify an 
equation incorporating fixed effects for state-specific growth common to all periods, period-
specific factors common across states, as well as period-specific factors unique to each state. In 
this context, current and lagged unemployment rates are expedient because they are cyclically 
sensitive to state- and regional-specific factors but mean reverting.  We employ an index 
constructed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1987) as a 
measure for the stringency of BBRs.  We use this index rather than the measure constructed by 
the U.S. General Accounting Office because the former is almost universally adopted and semi 
continuous, rather than simply dichotomous (strict or not).1  We rely on a long j-interval, 
recursive structure, where j alternately equals one (five years) or two (ten years), as well as an 
error-correction term. 
IV.1 Baseline specification 
Our baseline empirical specification is equation (1): 
(1) Vit =c +ci +ct +b1dit-j +b2Di t-j +b3ACIRi*Dit-j +B1Xi (t-j) +B2Zit + eit 
                                                 
1 Krol and Svorny (2007) identify anomalies in the two measures, but they are not directly 
comparable: the KS index is dichotomous (strict or lenient), the ACIR index is semi continuous. 
Thus far, only KS have preferred the GAO measure. 
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Where (Vit) is the change in the log of real personal income per capita for state i in period t.  (c) 
is a fixed intercept common to all states in all periods; (ci) is a state-specific intercept common to 
all periods, and j is a discrete lag of j periods.  (ct) is a period-specific intercept common to all 
states.  (dit) and (Dit) respectively, are the budget deficit and the stock of state and local 
government debt, with coefficients b1 and b2.2  Again, (ACIRi) is a commonly used index 
(ranging from zero to ten) for the stringency of each state’s balanced budget rule.  Our focus is 
on (b3) the nonlinear effect of ACIR on the productivity of debt.  (B1) is a vector of coefficients 
for other components of the state and local government budget constraint (denoted by Xi (t-j)).  
(B2) is a vector of coefficients for period-specific factors unique to each state (denoted by (Zit).  
All fiscal variables represent percentage points of state personal income, and (eit) is the residual 
for state i in period t.  The long lag length for the ACIR-debt interaction should yield a 
conservative test of the WW hypothesis.  Nevertheless, we challenge the hypothesis using GMM 
estimation and several robustness checks, including a placebo test.  
IV.2 Government budget constraint 
For n elements of a government budget constraint, only n-1 elements are independent, so at least 
one element must be omitted in the estimation of linear fiscal effects.  Bania and others (2007), 
Bleaney and others (2001), and Mofidi and Stone (1990) explain and illustrate the widely 
ignored empirical implication of this fact: the linear effect of a change in an element of X, the 
government budget constraint is necessarily relative to the effect of a compensating change in 
                                                 
2 To construct a relative, non negative metric, we scale deficits by subtracting the smallest (most 
negative) deficit in the sample from each state’s deficit, so that deficits are positive deviations 
from the most negative deficit [e.g. d - (-1)= d+ 1>0]. 
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one or more omitted elements, so that the linear effect of each element may not be legitimately 
interpreted as an independent effect.  In our regression specification of eq. (1), we include the 
lagged deficit, taxes, and federal inter governmental transfers but omit total expenditures and 
other residual revenue sources, so these budget elements become the reference category.  
IV.3 Data 
Consistent with several prior studies, we rely on data at five-year intervals and omit Alaska due 
to the dominance of the Alaska pipeline and the consequent outlying variances in fiscal variables 
relative to other states.  Use of five-year interval data allows a longer sample period from 1957 
than the more limited and higher-frequency annual data, which for state and local public 
expenditures begin only in 1977.  For present purposes, five-year intervals also have the 
advantage of suppressing short-term cyclical factors relative to low-frequency factors important 
to the intermediate- to long-run variations in growth relevant to our analysis.  Use of five-year 
intervals has proven useful in this context in other studies, including Mofidi and Stone (1990), 
Bania and others (2007), Reed (2008), and Gray and Stone (2012). Of course a five-year interval 
would be too long if one focused primarily on short-term cyclical factors, as in Carlino and 
Inman (2013). Regional unemployment rates for example, tend to be strongly mean reverting by 
five to ten years (e.g. Eberts and Stone, 1992).  
      Data for state and local government fiscal variables are from the Census of Governments.  
Related economic, demographic, and other data for corresponding years are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics or the Department of Commerce (for personal income).  
      Table (1) reports summary statistics for the five-year-interval data used to estimate equation 
with the exception of the ACIR index, which is unchanged during the period.  Values for ACIR 
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range from zero to ten and have an average and median of about 8 and a standard deviation of 
about 3.  
V. ESTIMATES 
We begin with ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates as our baseline estimates eq. (1).   
OLS estimates are reported in Table (2) for a lag of 2 periods (ten years), one period prior to the  
base year for growth, which yields a strictly recursive structure.  
 The R-squared of 0.61 in Table 2 is respectably large for a five-year growth interval, and 
the coefficient for the ACIIR-debt interaction (3.9) is significantly positive at the five percent 
level, consistent with the WW argument that BBRs increase growth by increasing the productive 
effect of debt by restricting public borrowing to investments in productive infrastructure.  
Coefficients for all other fiscal variables are insignificant at p<.05 at this long-lag interval, 
although lagged DEBT is significantly negative at p<.10.  Carlino and Inman (2013) and Eberts 
and Stone (1992) also report insignificant effects for similarly long horizons.  In this context, the 
significance of the ACIR-debt interaction is striking.  Note, again, that ACIR cannot be included 
independently because it contains no variation independent from state and period fixed effects, 
so any direct effects of the ACIR index if any, are captured by the fixed effects. We turn next to 
the issue of whether the coefficient for the interaction is identified by endogenous or exogenous 
variation and then to issues of robustness and placebo regressions. 
V.1 Exogeneity 
To perform a standard Hausman test of the null hypothesis of exogeneity, we rely on three-
period lagged values of the independent variables as instruments for the ACIR-debt interaction.  
That is, we use the ACIR-debt interaction lagged fifteen years and similarly lagged values of the 
other independent variables.  The first-stage regression (not reported here) yields an R-squared of 
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0.83 and an F statistic of 32, well above the Stock-Yogo (2001) critical value for the null 
hypothesis of weak instruments.3  Results for the Hausman test are reported in Table (3), where 
the p value for the coefficient for the first-stage residual (H-TEST) fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity for the ACIR-debt interaction at the five percent level.  Even so, we 
also report estimates based on the two-step, generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator in 
Table (4).  The coefficient for the interaction term is significantly positive and rises 
insignificantly (based on the Hausman test) from the OLS estimate of 3.9 to 4.5; the Hansen’s J 
statistic of 27.3 fails to reject exogeneity for the instruments at the five percent level;4 the null 
hypothesis for an insignificant AR2 is not rejected; and the coefficient for lagged growth (-0.01) 
in Table (4) is notably small and insignificant.  We have no reason thus far, to abandon the OLS 
estimates in Table (2), so we take the OLS estimate of 3.9 as our preferred estimate and report 
the GMM estimates in Table (4) merely for comparison. 
V.2 Robustness 
The OLS results in Table (2) are qualitatively invariant to several alternative specifications, 
including the addition of controls for the age composition of the population5 or the addition of 
PROD, the lagged state income share invested in productive public infrastructure.  The latter 
suggests that the coefficient for the ACIR-debt interaction is not significantly influenced by 
cyclical investments in public infrastructure.  What aspect of the specification is not robust?  
Shortening the lag interval from two periods to only one (from ten to five years) disrupts the 
                                                 
3 Individual unit roots are rejected for all variables. 
4 (Chi-square/37-17/.05= 31.4). 
5 (percent of population 5-17, 18-64, and the implicit remainder for younger than 5 or older than 
over 64). 
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strictly recursive structure and yields an insignificant coefficient of (3.0) for the ACIR-DEBT 
interaction in Table (5).  Not surprisingly, results in Table (6) for a Hausman test for the one-lag 
specification identified analogously to the longer two-period lag specification that is, with 
independent variables lagged j+1 (two) periods as instruments reject exogeneity at the five 
percent level at this shorter lag. Evidence that single-lagged values are endogenous is a useful 
finding, given that previously published studies have relied on single-period lags for 
identification.  The two-period lag specification appears superior even for the five-year intervals. 
In light of the endogeneity present in the one-lag specification, we present GMM estimates for 
the one-period lagged specification with two-period lagged instruments.  Table (7) reports these 
estimates, and the ACIR-debt coefficient is again significantly positive at (3.3).  Unlike the two-
lag GMM specification based on three-period lagged instruments, the one-period lag GMM 
coefficient for lagged growth in Table (7) is significantly positive at (0.19).  Even so, an 
insignificant AR2 is not rejected, and the Hansen J-statistic of 27.3 fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity for the instruments.6  All estimates in Tables 2 through 7 for which 
exogeneity is not rejected yield a significantly positive coefficient for the ACIR-debt interaction, 
regardless of specification or estimator.  The median across the range of these estimates (3.3 to 
4.5) is 3.9, which coincides with the OLS estimate for the two-lag strictly recursive, 
specification—our preferred specification.  We now turn to placebo regressions as another form 
of robustness check.    
V.3 Placebo regressions 
Placebo regressions are useful as a test for whether or not an effect is spurious because it is 
present where it should not be.  An expedient choice for a placebo regression in the present 
                                                 
6 chi square/38-19/.05= 30.1) 
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context is to test whether the ACIR-debt interaction in one region has a significant effect in other 
regions, even though it should not, unless region spillovers are important.  To test whether the 
ACIR-debt interaction in any of the nine Census regions has a significant effect on growth of 
other regions, we regress growth across all states in turn, on the ACIR-DEBT variable for each 
of the nine Census regions.  Note that these placebo regressions are not a test for the general 
significance of regional spillovers from one specific region to another individual region.  Instead, 
they are a test of whether regional spillovers or other factors spuriously common to states are 
responsible for the positive estimate for the effect of the ACIR-debt interaction in Table (2).  
Placebo regressions in this context are expediently conservative in the sense that regional 
spillovers will bias results toward a false placebo effect.  Even so, we find no significantly 
positive effect for the ACIR-debt interaction in any of the nine regressions.  To illustrate the 
results of the nine placebo regressions in a compact form, Table (8) presents results for the 
ACIR-DEBT interaction for Census region 4, which closely coincide with the median result 
across the nine placebo regressions. The next robustness check is to gauge the sensitivity of the 
results to outlying observations. 
V.4 Outliers 
To address the issue of sensitivity to outlying observations, residuals that are more than two 
standard deviations above or below the regression norm are identified, and dummy variables 
identifying these observations are added to the primary regression specification. Results from 
this augmented regression are equivalent and the correlations between the outlier residuals and 
the two key variables, growth and ACIR*DEBT are insignificant.  The final robustness check is 
to determine the sensitivity of the standard errors to alternative correction procedures.  
V.5 Standard errors 
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We explore the sensitivity of the standard errors by obtaining state-specific residual variances 
and period-specific residual variances from the OLS residuals from the specification in Table 2, 
including both state and period fixed effects. The variance across the state-specific residuals is 
3.43, and the variance across the period-specific residuals is 3.59. The ratio of the latter to the 
former is 1.06, indicating slightly greater dispersion across periods than across states, which is 
why Table (2) reports period-weight panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs). If cross-section 
weight PCSEs are used instead, results are equivalent. The cross-section weight PCSE for the 
ACIR–DEBT coefficient is (2.12).  We also calculate the period SUR (PCSE) for the ACIR-
DEBT coefficient, and again the results are equivalent. The period SUR PCSE is (2.03). 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Given the regression estimates in Table (2), we are now in a position to discuss whether 
or not BBRs change the effect of debt on growth, and if so, how.  The significantly positive 
coefficient for the ACIR-debt interaction suggests that the answer to the first question is ‘yes’: 
more stringent BBRs make debt more productive, consistent with the WW view that these rules 
increase the productiveness of debt by restricting borrowing to productive public infrastructure.  
This effect could work either directly through the greater productivity of investments in public 
infrastructure or more indirectly by assuring lenders that future borrowing will be limited to 
public infrastructure, resulting in lower costs of borrowing.  Both channels are consistent with 
the evidence in Alt and Lowry (1997) and others that borrowing costs are lower for states with 
more stringent budget rules.  
How large is the effect of BBRs on the productivity of debt in terms of growth?  With no 
BBR in place (i.e., with an ACIR index of zero) and evaluated at sample means, the coefficients 
in Table (2) indicate that a one standard-deviation increase in the stock of debt (an increase of 
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5.6 percent of personal income) decreases the steady-state (five-year) growth rate by 17.4 
percent of real income—just over 3 percent per year.  However, with a strict BBR in place (i.e., 
with an ACIR index of 10), the coefficients predict instead an increase in the steady-state (five-
year) growth rate of about 15 percent for a one-standard-deviation increase in debt.  
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Evidence elsewhere indicates that balanced-budget rules lower borrowing costs and 
restrain levels of state and local debt. Our evidence also indicates that high levels of debt can 
slow growth, but our unique contribution is to provide an arguably well-identified test of the 
hypothesis that state-level balanced-budget restrictions in the U. S. increase growth by restricting 
borrowing to productive public infrastructure.  Evidence that state balanced-budget restrictions 
increase growth via this channel provides the first formal test of the WW hypothesis and adds a 
new perspective to the effects of balanced-budget rules by suggesting that the benefits of tax 
smoothing and fiscal flexibility (permitted in the absence of a balanced-budget restriction) may 
come at the expense of lower growth.  We close however, with caveats; we provide evidence 
relevant to the WW hypothesis, not a comprehensive analysis of the merits of balanced-budget 
and other fiscal restrictions. In particular, the context for fiscal policy differs in obvious and 
important ways for countries and sub-national states. Auerbach (2007) for example, analyzes 
federal fiscal policy ‘rules’ and issues for recent decades. 
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TABLE 1 Summary Statistics (49 states 1957-2007) 
 GROWTH DEFICIT* DEBT TAXES FED UR 
Mean 11.76 8.33 17.27 10.07 3.57 5.93 
Median 11.39 8.32 16.63 10.01 3.37 5.58 
Maximum 30.14 11.59 42.69 17.75 7.68 15.45 
Minimum -9.93 0.00 4.52 7.13 0.91 2.00 
Std. Dev. 5.56 0.99 5.61 1.33 1.27 2.11 
Obs 441 441 441 441 441 441 
GROWTH is the log change in real personal income per capita (five-year intervals). 
Fiscal data are percentage points of state personal income. See text for data.  
*scaled to non negative by subtracting the smallest deficit. The raw mean is (-0.09). 
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   TABLE 2 Two-Lag OLS Growth Estimates 
   49 states 1957-2007   
   no. obs. 391) 
  (period weight PCSEs) 
 
 
  
 
Variable  Coeff Std. Error              Prob.   
C/100** 2.740 0.861 0.000 
DEFICIT-2 0.226 0.256 0.378 
DEBT-2*                 -20.406 10.727 0.058 
ACIR*DEBT-2**                   3.878                                                                         1.230 0.002
ACIR*YEAR**                    -0.014                                                           0.004 0.001
TAXES-2                   0.106 0.340 0.755 
FED-2                   0.209 0.529 0.692 
UR**                 -2.105 0.234 0.000 
UR-2**                  0.459 0.126             0.003 
   State and period fixed**    
R-squared                  0.611   
**p< .05 *p<.10  
 See text for data 
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TABLE 3 Hausman Test, Two-Lag Estimates 
(no. obs. 391)   
(period weight PCSEs)    
    
Variable           Coefficient  Std.   Error Prob. 
C/100** 2.52 1.05 0.02 
DEFICIT-2 0.01 0.30 0.97 
DEBT-2 -9.61 18.41 0.60 
ACIR*DEBT-2* 3.84 2.26 0.09 
ACIR*YEAR** -0.01  .001 0.02 
TAXES-2 0.38          0.29 0.19 
FED-2 0.45          0.40 0.26 
UR**             -2.08          0.17 0.00 
UR-2* 0.28          0.16 0.09 
H-TEST* -2.25          1.29 0.08 
State fixed**     
Period fixed**   
R-squared                    0.58   
** p<.05, * p<.10   
See text for data   
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 TABLE 4 Two-Lag GMM Growth Estimates 
 
Notes: 
**p<.05 
*p<.10  
See text 
for data 
(No.obs. 391)  
White period instrument weighting matrix  
(White-period std.err.) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
        
Prob.   
GROWTH-1)    -0.013 0.042 0.743 
DEFICIT-2)     0.138 0.148 0.353 
DEBT-2)**  -26.361 7.134 0.000 
ACIR*DEBT-2)**     4.535 0.898 0.000 
TAXES-2)     0.086 0.141 0.540 
ACIR*YEAR**    -0.013 0.002 0.000 
FED-2)**     0.396 0.254 0.119 
               UR**    -1.936 0.125 0.000 
UR-2)**     0.478 0.081 0.000 
State and Period  fixed**    
R-squared                              0.522        
    
AR2 (p=0.433)    
J-statistic    27.3 Instrument rank 37  
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TABLE 5 One-Lag OLS Growth Estimates   
          (No. obs. 489) 
          (period weight PCSEs)  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   
C/100** 2.945 84.133 0.005 
ACIR*DEBT-1            2.976 1.927 0.123 
DEFICIT-1           -0.069 0.285 0.806 
DEBT-1          -30.583 16.918 0.071 
ACIR*YEAR**           -0.013 0.005 0.009 
TAXES-1             0.291 0.264 0.272 
FED-1**             0.994 0.364 0.006 
UR**            -2.070 0.160 0.000 
UR-1**             0.662 0.159 0.000 
Cross-section fixed**  
Period fixed**  
R-squared                                           0.583 
**p<.05 *p<.10 
See text for data 
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TABLE 6 Hausman Test One-Lag Estimates 
(No. obs. 391)  
(period weight PCSEs) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   
    C/100**  2.369 0.997 0.027 
ACIR*DEBT-1 -0.091 2.085 0.965 
DEFICIT-1 -0.223 0.290 0.442 
DEBT-1      -15.425 17.875 0.388 
ACIR*YEAR** -0.012 0.006 0.043 
TAXES-1 -0.073 0.288 0.798 
FED-1**  1.539 0.392 0.000 
UR** -2.112 0.160 0.000 
UR-1**  0.578 0.171 0.000 
H-TEST**  2.265 0.821 0.006 
    
State and Period fixed** 
**p< .05, *p<.10  
R-squared                            0.615  
see text for data   
 
23 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 One-Lag GMM  Growth Estimates  
 
(No. obs.489) period weight instrument matrix)   
White-period standard errors) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   
    GROWTH-1** 0.199           0.062 0.001 
DEFICIT-1 0.114 0.363 0.752 
DEBT-1 -14.390 13.498 0.287 
ACIR*DEBT-1** 3.273 1.526 0.032 
ACIR*YEAR** -0.009 0.002 0.000 
TAXES-1** -0.734 0.258 0.004 
FED-1** 1.890 0.213 0.000 
UR** -2.107 0.114 0.000 
UR-1** 1.141 0.246 0.000 
          State and Period fixed**  
  
           **p< .05. *p<.10   
           See text for data.   
 
         AR2 p=0.141            J-statistic            31.4  Instrument rank 38  
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TABLE 8 Placebo Regressions: Median Result for Census Regions  (Census Region 
4) 
Dependent Variable: GROWTHREG4  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 440  
White-period standard errors) 
  Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.   
    C/100**            0.767 0.385677 0.0470 
ACIR*DEBT-2 0.320 0.540276 0.5538 
DEFICIT-2 0.171 0.140513 0.2231 
DEBT-2 -3.881 4.266604 0.3635 
ACIR*YEAR* -0.004 0.002400 0.0568 
FED-2  0.228 0.168553 0.1760 
UR     0.032 0.044967 0.4749 
UR-2 0.053 0.086337 0.5395 
TAXES-2 -0.216 0.251445 0.3907 
Cross-section fixed**         
Period fixed**  
R-squared  
**sig at .05 see text for data and variables. 
 0.846 
 
        
